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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 1, 1995, the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights

Protection Act,1 (Property Rights Act or Act), became law in the State
of Florida. In a nutshell, the Property Rights Act creates an avenue of
relief for a private landowner whose property has been "inordinately
burdened" by a specific action of a state or local governmental entity.'
The Property Rights Act provides the landowner with a cause of action
"separate and distinct" from the law of takings.4 This is significant
since the law of takings has proven to be inadequate to protect
landowners from overly burdensome governmental intrusions on private
property rights.5 The Property Rights Act is designed to address many

1. FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995).
2. Although the Act became effective on October 1, 1995, the Act provides that:
No cause of action exists under this section as to the application of any law
enacted on or before May 11, 1995, or as to the application of any rule,
regulation, or ordinance adopted, or formally noticed for adoption, on or before
that date. A subsequent amendment to any such law, rule, regulation, or
ordinance gives rise to a cause of action under this section only to the extent
that the application of the amendatory language imposes an inordinate burden
apart from the law, rule, regulation, or ordinance being amended.

§ 70.001(12). In other words, the Act is not retroactive.
3. Id. § 70.001(2).
4. Id. § 70.001(1).
5. See GOVERNOR'S PROPERTY RIGHTS STUDY COMM'N II, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
PROPERTY RIGHTS STUDY COMMISSION II 57 (1994) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT] ("Resort
to the judicial system did not seem to present a meaningful opportunity. Judges were perceived
as not having the expertise in takings law that would be needed .... ).
FLA. STAT.
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of the shortcomings of traditional takings jurisprudence, particularly in
the area of ripeness.6
Historically, a landowner in Florida seeking relief from governmental
burdens on property was required to overcome far too many obstacles
before a court would hear the merits of the claim.' These obstacles are
primarily the result of ripeness requirements. Under the land use
ripeness test, formulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,8
the landowner is required to secure a final decision from the burdening
agency and, if seeking federal court jurisdiction, must seek compensation from the state before the claim will be ripe for judicial review.9
Not only does this test lack any notion of equity,'" but it also is applied
in a much more rigid manner than the traditional ripeness test." The
land use ripeness requirements have been interpreted by many courts to
force the landowner to conduct a "wild goose chase" 2 to track down
a final decision from the burdening governmental agency.

6. See David L. Powell et al., A Measured Step to Protect Private Property Rights, 23
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 255, 282 (1995); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Florida'sProperty Rights Act:
A PoliticalQuick Fix Results in a Mixed Bag of Tricks, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 333 (1995).
7. See Stephen I. Adler & Daniel M. Anderson, Takings and Related Causes of Action
Under Federal and Texas Law, 1994 INST. ON PLAN., ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN § 9.02(4),
at 9-33 to 9-42 (Carol J. Holgren ed.) (discussing the numerous requirements a landowner has
to meet to fulfill ripeness requirements for a takings claim).
8. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
9. Id. at 186.
10. See Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial Relegation of
Constitutionally ProtectedPropertyRights, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 2-10 (1992). "Conspicuously
absent from this new doctrine [land use ripeness] are the equitable considerations which formed
the basis of the Court's more established definition of ripeness." Id. at 2.
11. See id. at 2-3 (stating that the courts have developed a ripeness doctrine that is
particularly rigid when applied to constitutional property rights claims); Gregory Overstreet, The
Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause:A Survey of Decisions Showing Just How FarFederal
Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 91, 91
(1994).
12. A circuit court judge expressed his sentiments on the ripeness requirements in the land
use context in a decision that was later reversed by the Fourth District Court of Appeals:
"[B]ackwards to any common sense; it is backwards to the way professional
land planners and architects proceed; and it places the burden of governing on
the wrong foot. Plaintiffs have the right to rely on the plain language of the
Defendant's Comprehensive Land Use Plan; they have the right to be guided
by common sense; and, they have the right to be dealt with forthrightly and
not shuffled off on a wild goose chase."
City of Riviera Beach v. Shillingburg, 659 So. 2d 1174, 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (quoting trial
court's second final order).
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Furthermore, confusion and inconsistency plague the judiciary's
application of the ripeness doctrine to land use litigation. 3 Due to the
variety of claims that may support a land use cause of action, 4 the
courts have had difficulty in distinguishing between the array of ripeness
standards that apply to these various claims. 5 In addition, many state
courts also require a claimant to exhaust administrative remedies before
the case will be deemed ripe for review. 6 Although exhaustion is not
a requirement of ripeness,17 the courts continue to intermingle these

13. See Michael M. Berger, The "Ripeness" Mess in FederalLand Use Cases or How the
Supreme Court Converted Federal Judges into Fruit Peddlers, 1991 INST. ON PLAN., ZONING
& EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.01, at 7-3 (Carol J.Holgren ed.) ("[The Supreme] Court has issued
Delphic pronouncements in the land use field which, taken together, produce no easily
discernible pattern.")- Vargas, supra note 5, at 333.
14. For instance, a land use claim may be pursued under a facial or as applied just
compensation takings claim, an as applied arbitraty and capricious due process claim, or a due
process takings claim. See, e.g., Tari v. Collier County, 56 F.3d 1533, 1535-36 (11 th Cir. 1995)
(considering an as applied arbitrary and capricious due process claim and a just compensation
temporary takings claim).
15. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 722 (1lth Cir. 1990) (stating "[c]ourts
have often confused the standards for [these claims] ... and often one cannot tell which claim
has been brought or which standard is being applied").
16. See, e.g., Lee County v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) ("In this
case, the trial court should have required appellees to exhaust their administrative remedies.");
Taylor v. Village of North Palm Beach, 659 So. 2d 1167, 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) ("The
ripeness doctrine, which requires a claimant to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting
to a judicial solution, is not just a technical requirement; it has a very practical application to
takings cases.").
17. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 474 U.S. 172, 19293 (1985); see also DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 8.08 (3d ed. 1993) ("The
exhaustion doctrine must be distinguished from the ripeness doctrine that is a barrier to bringing
land use cases in federal court."); 5 JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 48.01, at
48-4 to 48-5 (1996) ("The ripeness concept should not be confused with exhaustion of
administrative remedies which, while related, focus on procedures rather than substance.").
Exhaustion has been described in the following manner:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies serves interests of
judicial economy by requiring parties to pursue all administrative solutions
before seeking judicial relief. It is designed to prevent judicial interference in
the administrative process and to allow the agencies an opportunity to develop
a complete factual record, apply their expertise and discretion, and possibly
resolve the conflict without judicial intervention. The doctrine is applied to
class actions, includes both state and federal administrative procedures, and
may be waived by either the courts or the agency.
Id. § 49.01. But see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
According to Professor Chemerinsky,
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two doctrines while many landowner's pursuits for relief are cast to the
side."8 As a result of the rigidity of the ripeness doctrine and the
confusion in the judiciary, the ripeness requirements in the land use
context have created an almost impenetrable wall between landowners
and the judicial system. 9
In recognition of the difficulty landowners have confronted in their
attempts to litigate governmental burdens on private property, the
Florida Legislature, in May of 1995, passed the Property Rights Act.20
Under the Property Rights Act, a landowner's dispute will constructively
ripen 180 days after the landowner submits a claim to the burdening
governmental entity.2" The Property Rights Act thus speeds up the
process for obtaining judicial review of burdensome governmental
actions.' To appreciate the significance of the ripeness provisions of
the Property Rights Act, it is important to analyze the ripeness doctrine
as it has been applied by both federal and state courts.'
Section II of this Article provides a synopsis of the general principles
of the ripeness doctrine. In Section III, this Article provides a history of
the application of the ripeness doctrine in the land use context by the
United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, and the Florida court system. Section IV summarizes
the ripeness requirements for land use claims in Florida. The pitfalls and
the harsh effects of the ripeness doctrine, as it has been applied to land
use claims, is highlighted in Section V. Section VI introduces the rise
of the Property Rights Movement in Florida and provides a synopsis of
Ripeness is obviously closely related to requirements for exhaustion of
administrative remedies before seeking federal court review; a case is not ripe
until such exhaustion has occurred. In fact, in cases claiming a government
taking of property without just compensation, the [Supreme] Court has held
that the matter is not ripe until compensation has been sought and denied
through the available administrative procedures.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
18. See, e.g., Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412, 1416 n.12 (11th Cir. 1994). Several
Florida courts also have applied the exhaustion requirement to land use claims. See, e.g., City
of Jacksonville Beach v. Prom, 656 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Florida Power Corp.
v. Department Envtl. Regulation, 605 So. 2d 149, 152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Monroe County v.
Gonzalez, 593 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Hill v. Monroe County, 581 So. 2d 225,
226-27 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); David v. City of Dunedin, 473 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla. 2d DCA
1985); Wood v. Twin Lakes Mobile Homes Village, 123 So. 2d 738, 740 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960).
19. See Kassouni, supra note 10, at 11; Overstreet, supra note 11, at 92.
20. FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995); see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
21. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)-(5).
22. Id.
23. See Overstreet, supra note 11, at 92 (stating that the ripeness doctrine is used by both
federal and state courts to preclude judicial review of land use claims).
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prior attempts to pass private property rights legislation in the Florida
Legislature. This Section culminates in the introduction and analysis of
the Private Property Rights Protection Act as it pertains to the ripeness
issue.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RIPENESS

Ripeness, a term simple in principle 4 yet perplexing in application," refers to conditions that must exist before a dispute is sufficiently mature to enable a court to decide a case on the merits. 6 If a court
determines that the conditions do not exist, the court will dismiss the
case on the grounds that the case is not ripe.27 Since the ripeness
determination is a threshold inquiry," a plaintiff whose case is dismissed as not ripe will generally have no judicial insight as to the
validity of the underlying claims.29 Generally, the court's dismissive
mandate will require a plaintiff to seek ripeness finality, a task that may
24. See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153,
161 (1987) (stating that "[t]he central principles of the ripeness doctrine are unproblematic").
25. See, e.g., Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness after Lucas, in AFTER LuCAs: LAND USE
REGULATION AND THE TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION 11, 12 (David L. Callies
ed., 1993) ("Interpreting the [Supreme] Court's ripeness rules has not been an easy task.");
Berger, supra note 13, § 7.01, at 7-2 ("The problem which has hard-working judges sounding
like so many fruit peddlers, squezing their cases to see whether they are ripe or not, has causes
which can be laid at several feet.").
26. See, e.g., Bruce I. Weiner, Casenote, Obstacles and Pitfallsfor Landowners: Applying
the Ripeness Doctrine to Section 1983 Land Use Litigation, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 387,
391 (1992). According to one treatise, "[a]lthough there is no precise definition of 'ripeness,'
the concept involves determining whether decisions of a particular agency are at a stage which
permits judicial resolution." STEIN ET AL., supra note 17, § 48.01, at 48-3. As another
commentator stated, "[r]ipeness ...is best understood as the determination of whether a federal
court can grant preenforcement review; for example, when may a court hear a request for a
declaratory judgement, or when must it decline review?" CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 2.4,
at 115. Yet another commentator describes the ripeness doctrine as "a tool designed to determine
when judicial review is appropriate." Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the
Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (1995).
Black's Law Dictionary states that "[a] case is ripe for decision by an appellate court if the
legal issues involved are clear enough and well enough evolved and presented so that a clear
decision can come out of the case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1327 (6th ed. 1990).

27. Weiner, supra note 26, at 391.
28. See, e.g., Shillingburg, 659 So. 2d at 1180; Terry D. Morgan, Regulatory Takings: A
State and Federal Perspective, 1991 INST. ON PLAN., ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.01, at

6-2 to 6-3 (Carol J. Holgren ed.).
29. See Morgan, supra note 28, § 6.02[l], at 6-3. "Ripeness for review is a question of
law, not fact, and it is error to submit the matter to a jury." Id. § 6.02[1], at 6-3 to 6-4 (citing
Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090
(1989); East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 896
F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989)).
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ultimately be akin to chasing a feather in the wind.3" Therefore, a
thorough understanding of the ripeness doctrine is an essential prerequisite for avoidance of wasted litigation efforts.3 '
Although there exists conflict concerning the specific justification for
the ripeness doctrine,32 the relevance of the doctrine can be supported
under both constitutional and prudential principles.33 The "case or
controversy" clause in Article II of the United States Constitution34
requires federal courts to dismiss merely hypothetical cases that lack any
clear and sufficient injury.35 In this aspect, ripeness promotes the
constitutional principle of Separation of Powers by "avoiding judicial
review in situations where it is unnecessary for the federal courts to
become involved because there is not a substantial hardship to postponing review. ,,36

30. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 13, § 7.03[3], at 7-24 (describing the variance
requirement of the ripeness doctrine in the land use arena as a "journey into never-never land").
31. See Overstreet, supra note 11, at 91 ("The ripeness doctrine of the Taking Clause is
the most important legal principle in federal land use litigation.").
32. Compare Morgan, supra note 28, § 6.02[1], at 6-3 ("A ripeness challenge goes to a
court's subject matter jurisdiction under the case or controversy clause of Article III of the
federal constitution.") with Nichol, supra note 24, at 156 ("[The Court's effort to bring the
ripeness doctrine under the umbrella of the case or controversy requirement is unfortunate. Not
only is constitutionalization inconsistent with the doctrine's premises, but it implies a rigidity
and formalism that are at odds with the doctrine's operation.").
33. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 13; Stein, supra note 26, at 11.
34. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States ...to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of
different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id. As Professor Chemerinsky notes: "The Supreme Court has interpreted the terms 'cases' and
'controversies' as creating important limits on federal judicial power." CHEMERINSKY, supra note
17, § 1.1, at 6.
35. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Worker's Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 302 (1979)
("mhe positions of the parties are sufficiently adverse.., to present a case or controversy ...."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 128 (1973) ("[W]e are not prepared to say that the bare
allegation of so indirect an injury is sufficient to present an actual case or controversy."). See
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 2.4.1, at 116; Weiner, supra note 26, at 391 ("Exercising
jurisdiction over a premature claim is beyond the power of the court under Article III. If the
court finds itself without jurisdiction, it has no power to enter a judgment on the merits and must
dismiss the action.").
36. CHEMEMNSKY, supra note 17, § 2.4.1, at 116.
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The prudential component of the doctrine, the more flexible,
judicially-crafted component that may be applied by both state and
federal courts, relates to the need to have a record supported by concrete
facts and decisions that a court can review. Without such a record, a
reviewing court would simply be performing guesswork in rendering a
decision on the dispute. The prudential aspect of ripeness also is utilized
by the judiciary to refrain from deciding cases that are within the court's
jurisdiction but are nonetheless inappropriate for judicial revew"
While both the constitutional and prudential justifications support the
ripeness doctrine,39 a court's decision to follow one or the other

37. "[R]ipeness is said to enhance the quality of judicial decision-making by ensuring that
there is an adequate record to permit effective review." Id. (footnote omitted). 'The prudential
restrictions result from the fact that most courts would rather avoid speculative cases, defer to
finders of fact with greater subject matter expertise, decide cases with fully-developed records,
and avoid overly broad opinions, even if these courts might constitutionally hear a dispute."
Stein, supra note 26, at 11; see also RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A
MODERN APPROACH (1989) ("It is not enough that a controversy might one day erupt; plaintiff
must show that it has already done so, thereby presenting a legal issue in a concrete context.").
38. Under the prudential component, "although the Constitution permits federal court
adjudication, the Court[s] ha[ve] decided that in certain instances wise policy militates against
judicial review." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 2.1, at 42. For instance, the exercise of
prudential ripeness was illustrated by Justice Brandeis when he stated, "[t]he Court [has]
developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of
rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions
pressed upon it for decision." Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936).
39. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81-82 (1978)
(finding sufficient Article III jurisdiction, the Court proceeded to note adequate prudential
ripeness justifications for review). In addition, several commentators have suggested that the
distinctions between constitutional and prudential ripeness are not clear. See CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 17, § 2.4.1, at 116 ("The focus on whether there is sufficient injury without
preenforcement review seems inextricably linked with the constitutional requirement for cases
and controversies, whereas the focus on the quality of the record seems prudential."); Roberts,
supra note 25, at 13 ("[T]he line between jurisdictional and prudential ripeness is a cloudy
one."). In addition to the constitutional and prudential justifications, there are various policy
arguments that have been asserted in support of the ripeness doctrine, including concerns for
judicial economy and effective judicial review. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 2.4.1, at 116.
One commentator proffered other policy justifications:
If a record is concrete rather than abstract in nature, the Court may find a way
of interpreting the statute to avoid or minimize the constitutional issue. The
statute may be interpreted to raise constitutional problems as applied to some
issues and not to others. Or, the application of customs behind the statute may
justify a narrow interpretation of its scope. Not to be excluded is the
possibility that if the Court waits for an actual controversy, the whole
constitutional problem may just be eliminated by later developments.
JOHN

E.

NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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drastically will affect a plaintiff's pursuit for relief.4" Viewed as a

prudential limit, a court may exercise discretion in applying the ripeness
doctrine,4 thereby granting the court more flexibility in determining
whether or not to decide the case on the merits.4 2 By contrast, a court
that is inclined to apply the ripeness doctrine pursuant to Article Iff4
will treat the ripeness question as a subject matter jurisdiction issue."
Accordingly, since subject matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any
point by either party45 or by the judge,46 a plaintiff may suddenly find

his case dismissed on ripeness grounds after tremendous time and cost
have been expended.47
Although the failure to satisfy the ripeness analysis has potentially
harsh effects, the standard ripeness test affords the courts an opportunity
40. It is important to note that the distinction between constitutional and prudential
ripeness illustrates how the doctrine is used by both the federal and state courts. For an analysis
of these distinctions, see R. Jeffrey Lyman, FinalityRipeness in FederalLand Use Casesfrom
Hamilton Bank to Lucas, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 101, 102 n.10 (1994) ("If finality ripeness
is a prudential concern, then any court may exercise its discretion to bar a developer's claims.
If it is animated by Article III of the federal Constitution, however, then the doctrine is
applicable only to the federal courts.") (citing PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WESCHLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM ch. II, §§ 231-269 (3d ed. 1988)).
It is well recognized that federal courts exercise ripeness under both constitutional and
prudential justifications. See supra note 39. It also is well recognized that state courts mandate
ripeness finality prior to hearing the merits of a plaintiff's claim. See infra pt. III.C. While the
state courts adopt and apply federal ripeness requirements, it has been noted that the state courts
apply ripeness not via any constitutional mandate such as Article Ill, but only under prudential
concerns. See Lyman, supra, at 102 n.10.
Even if the state courts are acting only under prudential ripeness, the state courts have not
exhibited any tendency to apply the doctrine any more flexibly than if it were being applied
under constitutional mandate. See infra pt. III.C. In this respect, the labels used to provide the
authority to apply ripeness are somewhat meaningless. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified
Approach to Justiciability,22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 692 (1990) ("[A] requirement is constitutional
if the Court says it is, and it is prudential if the Court says it is that. Nothing in the content of
the [justiciability] doctrines explains their constitutional or prudential status."). Recently, a
majority of the United States Supreme Court labelled ripeness as prudential. Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1012-13 (1992).
41. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012-13; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 114-18 (1976).
43. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Tari, 56 F.3d at 1535; Reahard,30 F.3d at 1415; Eide, 908 F.2d at 720;
Morgan, supra note 28, § 6.02[l], at 6-3; Roberts, supra note 25, at 13.
45. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 5.1, at 249.
46. Id. § 5.1, at 250.
47. See, e.g., City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, 641 So. 2d 1377, 1379 (Fla.
4th DCA 1994) (noting that expense of extended litigation was hampering developer's ability
to complete project); Kassouni, supra note 10, at I1 ("The time and money required to comply
with myriad ripeness requirements will prevent most middle-class property owners from pursuing
their constitutional right to just compensation.").
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to incorporate equitable considerations into the analysis. 48 This ripeness
test, exemplified by the United States Supreme Court in Abbott
Laboratoriesv. Gardner,49 requires a court to evaluate "the fitness of
the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration."5 For instance, the Abbott Court
granted preenforcement review of The Food and Drug Administration's
regulation requiring the inclusion of generic names for prescription
drugs on all labels." After determining that the issue presented was a
"purely legal one, ' 2 the court stated that "where a regulation requires
an immediate and significant change in the plaintiffs' conduct of their
affairs with serious penalties attached to noncompliance, access to the
courts ... must be permitted. . . ."" Even though this test is somewhat
flexible, 4 and incorporates equitable considerations, 5 the test has been
48. See Kassouni, supra note 10, at 2 ("In many cases, especially those involving First
Amendment freedom of speech issues, equity has been the strongest argument in favor of
judicial review.").
49. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
50. Id. at 149. As the Court stated:
The injunctive and declaratory judgment remedies are discretionary, and courts
traditionally have been reluctant to apply them to administrative determinations
unless these arise in the context of a controversy "ripe" for judicial resolution.
Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the ripeness doctrine it is fair
to say that its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements
over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects
felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. This problem is best seen in
a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.
Id. at 148-49 (footnote omitted). Thus, it could be stated that this test incorporates both
constitutional and prudential concerns.
51. Id. at 152-53.
52. Id. at 149. This purely legal issue was "whether the [enabling] statute was properly
construed by the Commissioner to require the established name of the drug to be used every time
the proprietary name is employed." Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 153. The Abbott Court, noting the costs involved with compliance with the
regulation and the detrimental effects on the public's confidence in the plaintiffs drug products
that may result if the plaintiffs were required to challenge the regulations only as a defense to
an action brought by the government, concluded that the hardship to the plaintiffs mandated
judicial review. Id. at 152-53.
54. Abbott Laboratorieswas influenced by United States v. Storer Broadcasting, 351 U.S.
192 (1956), Frozen Foods Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956), and Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942), three cases that "ha[d] taken a ...
flexible view of finality." Abbott Laboratories,387 U.S. at 150-51.
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problematic. Due to difficulty in applying the ripeness standards,56 this
test has led to confusion 7 and inconsistency58 in the judicial system.
III. THE ORIGINS OF RIPENESS IN LAND USE
A. The United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court's pronouncements on the ripeness
doctrine in the land use arena have left lower courts, landowners, and
commentators baffled. In its attempt to fashion a land use ripeness
doctrine, the Court has been criticized as being elusive 9 and unpredictable.' Furthermore, the ripeness rules that can be discerned from the
Court's decisions have been referred to as "a body of devices which are
elaborate decision-avoiders." 6 ' Nonetheless, an overview of the Court's
handling of the ripeness issue in the land use context is an appropriate
starting point. As the end of this section illustrates, the Court recently
has granted certiorari on a ripeness case from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 2 Perhaps the Court will take this
opportunity to clear up the havoc that the lower courts have created in
interpreting the following decisions.
1. Laying the Tracks For Finality: Penn Central and Agins
The United States Supreme Court's application of ripeness principles
to land use cases began in 1978 in Penn Central TransportationCo. v.
City of New York. 63 In Penn Central, the owners of Grand Central
55. See supra note 48.
56. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 2.4.1, at 116 ("The questions of whether there is

sufficient hardship to permit preenforcement review and whether the record is adequately
focused cannot be reduced to a formula.").
57. Id. ("[I]t is often difficult to distinguish why in some instances ripeness was found,
but in other seemingly similar circumstances it was denied.").
58. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 39, at 68 ("While th[e] general ripeness principal
is not disputed, its application by the Supreme Court has resulted in a line of cases with
seemingly inconsistent rulings. At least the grounds distinguishing them are too subtle for the
commentators to appreciate.").
59. Stein, supra note 26, at 3.
60. See Brian W. Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owners:
The Ripeness and Abstention Doctrinesin Section 1983 Land Use Cases,2 HOFsTRA PROP. L.J.

73, 94 (1988) ("None of the judicial pronouncements on finality provide any reliable method for
determining when an application is truly 'meaningful' and reapplication is not necessary for a
takings claim or any other claim to be ripe for consideration." (emphasis in original)).
61. Berger, supra note 13, § 7.02, at 7-3 to 7-4.
62. Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 117
S. Ct. 293 (Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 96-243); see infra pt. III.A.4.
63. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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Station applied to New York City's Landmarks Preservation Commission for permission to construct a 55-story office building on the roof
of Grand Central Station.' The Commission, which had designated the
Station an historic landmark a year earlier,65 rejected the applications.66 The owners then filed suit, claiming that the application of New
York City's Landmark Preservation Law to their property constituted a
taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.67
Rejecting that there was a taking of the property, the Court noted
that there were other permissible uses of the property available to the
owner.6" The Court was convinced that there was a possibility that an
application for the construction of a "smaller structure" would be
approved by the Commission. 69 Therefore, since the owners did not
reapply after the initial permit was denied, the Court resisted assuming
that the Commission would not approve a less intensive application.7"
This decision paved the way for subsequent requirements that an
applicant modify or resubmit a proposal before a case is ripe, with some
courts applying the rationale that an agency should be given the
"opportunity to change its mind."'"
The Supreme Court continued to lay the foundations of the ripeness
doctrine in the land use context in Agins v. City of Tiburon.72 In Agins,
the owners of prestigious waterfront property claimed that their property
was taken without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.73 The
landowners sought $2 million in damages as well as a declaration that

64. Id. at 116.
65. Id. at 115. Once a site was designated a landmark, the owner had a duty to keep the
building in good repair. Id. at 111-12. Any alteration to the landmark had to be approved by the
Commission. Id. at 112.
66. Id. at 117.
67. Id. at 119.
68. Id. at 136-37,
69. Id. The court noted in a footnote that "[clounsel for appellants admitted at oral
argument that the Commission has not suggested that it would not, for example, approve a 20story office tower along the lines of that which was part of the original plan for the terminal."
Id. at 137 n.34.
70. Id. at 137. "[N]othing the Commission has said or done suggests an intention to
prohibit any construction above the terminal." Id.
71. See, e.g., Tinnerman, 641 So. 2d at 525 ("[T]he ripeness requirement of a final
decision requires more than finality because it includes an opportunity for government to change
its mind.").
72. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
73. Id. at 257.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol47/iss3/2

12

Maraist: A Statutory Beacon in the Land of Use Ripeness Maze: The Florida
RIPENFES DOCI'RINE

the zoning ordinances were unconstitutional.74 According to the
complaint, recently adopted zoning ordinances limited the use of their
property to one-family dwellings, accessory buildings, and open-space
uses.75 Although the owners claimed that the city had "completely
destroyed the value of [the] property for any purpose,"76 their fatal flaw
was that they had never sought approval for the development of their
land under the zoning ordinances. 7
The Court declined to rule on the as applied challenge since the
landowners did not submit a plan for development, as the ordinances
required.78 According to the Court, there was no concrete controversy
regarding the application of the specific zoning provisions since the
ordinance was not actually applied to the owners property.79 With
regard to the facial challenge, the Court ruled that, because the
ordinance permitted construction of up to five residences on their
property, the appellants' were free to pursue their reasonable investment
expectations by submitting a development plan to local officials."
Therefore, the adoption of the ordinance did not. constitute a taking of
the property.8
2. The Williamson County Test
Both Penn Central and Agins demanded a final decision regarding
application of an ordinance or regulation to a claimant's property.
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank 2
extended this notion and incorporated it into a two-prong ripeness test
that the Court applied to a land use claim.83 In Williamson County, the
county adopted zoning ordinances and subdivision regulations that
allowed cluster development in order to provide for open space in the
74. Id. at 258.

75. Id. at 257. The zoning ordinances placed the property in a Residential Planned
Development and Open Space Zone. Id. In addition, density restrictions limited the amount of
single family dwellings on the five-acre tract to between one and five. Id.
76. Id. at 258. The owners claimed that the land was "the most expensive suburban
property in the State, and that the best possible use of the land [was] residential." Id at 262.
77. Id. at 257.
78. Id. at 260.
79. Id. "Construction is not permitted until the builder submits a plan compatible with
'adjoining patterns of development and open space.' In passing upon a plan, the city also will
consider how well the proposed development would preserve the surrounding environment and
whether the density of new construction will be offset by adjoining open spaces." Id. at 262
(quoting TIBURON, CAL. ORD. No. 123 N.S. § 2(F)).
80. Id. at 262.
81. Id. at 263.
82. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
83. Id. at 186.
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community. 4 Pursuant to these regulations," the developer received
preliminary plat approval for a cluster residential home development.86
Thereafter, the developer conveyed to the county a permanent open
space easement for a golf course and spent nearly $3 million building
the golf course and $500,000 installing sewer and water facilities.8 7 The
preliminary plat was reapproved four times before the Commission gave
final plat approval for 212 single-family dwellings.88
In 1977, the county changed the density provisions of its zoning
ordinance.89 Although the Commission initially renewed the preliminary plat under the new regulations, the Commission later rejected a
revised plan the developer was required to submit before seeking
approval for the remaining sections of the subdivision.' The developer
appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals, which determined that the
Commission should have applied the 1973 ordinances and regulations. 9
Nonetheless, the Commission refused to follow the Board's
decision92
93
plats.
and disapproved two subsequently filed preliminary

84. Id. at 176. Cluster zoning allows homes to be grouped together rather than being
evenly spaced so a common area can be retained as an open space. See id. A golf course
community is a good example.
85. Id. at 177. The County's subdivision ordinance and the commission's subdivision
regulations required developers to first seek approval of a preliminary plat. Id. Approval of a
preliminary plat did not constitute approval of a final plat and approval of a preliminary plat
would lapse if a final plat was not submitted within one year of the date of approval, unless the
commission granted an extension or the approval of the preliminary plat was renewed. Id. The
final plat "was required to conform substantially to the preliminary plat, and, in addition, to
include such details as the lines of all streets, lots, boundaries, and building setbacks." Id.
86. Id. The preliminary plat indicated that 260 acres of the 676 acre development was to
be reserved for an open space golf course. Id. The number of allowable dwelling units was 736,
but lot lines were drawn in for only 469 units. Id.
87. Id. at 178.
88. Id.
89. Id. The new ordinance required that calculations of allowable density exclude 10% of
the total acreage to account for roads and utilities and reduced the number of allowable units
from 1.089 per acre to I per acre. Id.
90. Id. at 179-80. The commission required a revised preliminary plat because the original
preliminary plat contained errors and omissions. Id. at 179. The commission rejected the revised
preliminary plat because it did not comply with the density requirements and the lots were
placed on slopes with a grade greater than 25%. Id.
91. Id. at 180-81. The Board was empowered to hear and decide appeals on land use
decisions and to hear and decide applications for variances. Id. at 181 n.3. Variances would be
granted "where by reason of exceptional topographic situations or conditions of a piece of
property the strict application of the provisions ... would result in practical difficulties to or
undue hardship upon the owner of such property." Id.
92. The Commission claimed that the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear appeals from the
Commission. Id. at 181-82.
93. Id.
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The landowner 4 then filed suit in federal court pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.95 Although the jury would have awarded the landowner
$350,000 for a temporary taking of the property, the court granted
judgement notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the Commission. 96
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed,
holding that the evidence supported the jury's finding of a temporary
taking.97
Although the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether governments must pay money damages to a
landowner whose property has been taken temporarily by the application
of government regulations, the Court ultimately declined to answer that
question.98 According to the Court, "[b]ecause respondent ha[d] not yet
obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning
ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property, nor utilized the
procedures [the state] provide[d] for obtaining just compensation,
respondent's claim [w]as not ripe."9 9 This statement is in essence the
two-prong test that has subsequently been applied in nearly every land
use case to determine if the case is ripe for judicial review." ° The
Court proceeded to detail the two prongs of the test.
The Williamson County Court justified the final decision prong by
stating that an as applied takings claim "is not ripe until the government
entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final
decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at
issue."'' 1 Although the landowner had satisfied the Agins threshold
requirement by submitting a plan for the development of the property,"0 2 the Williamson County Court ruled that the landowner should
have taken the extra step to request a variance from the zoning
ordinance and subdivision regulations. 3 Under the Williamson County
94. Id. at 181. Hamilton Bank acquired, through foreclosure, the 257.65 acres that had not
been approved for development. I Hamilton Bank submitted the plat that had been initially
approved in 1973 and subsequently reapproved several times. Id. The bank also submitted a new
plat seeking development of only 688 units, reflecting density adjustments for land that had been
taken for a parkway. Id.
95. Id. at 182.
96. Id. at 183.
97. Id. at 183-84.
98. Id. at 185. "Once again, we find that the question is not properly presented, and must
be left for another day" Id.
99. Id. at 186.
100. See infra pt. IV.
101. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186.

102. Id. at 187.
103. Id. at 187-88. According to the Court, a variance would have allowed the owners to
develop the property according to its proposed plat. Id. at 188. "It appears that variances could
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test, the landowner must request a variance from each regulation that
formed the basis for denying the original application."° According to
the Court, "until the administrative agency has arrived at a final,
definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue
to the particular land in question,"'' 5 it is "impossible to tell whether
the land retained any reasonable beneficial use or whether respondent's
expectation interests had been destroyed."" The Commission's refusal
to approve the preliminary plat left the owner with the option to develop
the subdivision according to its plat after obtaining variances.'"
Therefore, since the respondent failed to seek any variance and since
there was no final reviewable administrative decision, the case was not
ripe.r0
Before leaving the analysis of the finality prong, the Court distinguished the ripeness finality requirement from the exhaustion of
administrative remedies frequently required under an administrative
challenge." ° According to the Court:
While the policies underlying the two concepts often
overlap, the finality requirement is concerned with whether
the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position
on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the
exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative
and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek
review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the
decision
is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropri0
ate.

have been granted to resolve at least five of the Commission's eight objections ... including
the ordinance's density requirements and its restriction on placing units on land with slopes
having a grade in excess of 25%." Id.
104. Id. at 189 n.11.
105. Id. at 191.
106. Id. at 189 n.ll.
107. Id. at 190.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 192-93.

110. Id. at 193. The Court continued:
Resort to [administrative exhaustion] procedures would result in a judgement
whether the commission's actions violated any of respondent's rights. In
contrast, resort to the procedure for obtaining variances would result in a
conclusive determination by the Commission whether it would allow
respondent to develop the subdivision in the manner respondent proposed.
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In sum, exhaustion of administrative procedures would not be required
so long as a landowner has obtained a final and definitive decision from
the agency enforcing the ordinance or regulation."'
The second prong of the Williamson County ripeness test is the
requirement that the landowner seek compensation through state
procedures, if the state has provided such procedures."' The Court
found this requirement to be implicit in the nature of a takings claim
since the Fifth Amendment proscribes only the taking of property
without just compensation."' Therefore, before a taking without just
compensation can be found, compensation must have been denied." 4
Analyzing the respondent's claim, the Court noted that Tennessee
law provided an inverse condemnation process whereby landowners
could seek compensation."' The Williamson County Court reasoned
that until a landowner seeks compensation through this inverse
condemnation process and is denied adequate compensation for the
taking, the State's action is not complete." 6 Accordingly, since
respondent
failed to pursue the state procedures, the claim was not
17
ripe.

The Williamson County Court also ruled that review of the claim
under a due process analysis was premature."' The Court did not
determine whether or not the regulation went "too far" so as to exceed
a valid exercise of the police power and constitute a due process
violation." 9 The Court ruled that it was unable to determine if this
regulation had gone "too far."" As the Court stated:

Ill. See id.
112. Id. at 194. This requirement is triggered if "the government has provided an adequate
process for obtaining compensation, and [that] resort to that process 'yield[s] just compensation.' "Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1013 (1984)).
113. Id. at 194 n.13.
114. Id. at 195.
115. Id. at 196.
116. Id. at 195.
117. Id.at 196-97.
118. Id. at 197-200. The Commission proffered that the landowner's claim should be
analyzed under a due process theory on the notion that a "regulation that goes so far that it has
the same effect as a taking by eminent domain is an invalid exercise of the police power." Id.
at 197, The remedy under the due process theory would be "invalidation of the regulation, and
if authorized and appropriate, actual damages." Id
119. Id.
120. Id. at 199-200. According to the Court, a regulation goes too far if it "becomes so
onerous that it has the same effect as an appropriation of the property through eminent domain
or physical possession." Id. at 199.
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[R]esolution of that question depends, in significant part,
upon an analysis of the effect the Commission's application
of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations had on
the value of respondent's property and investment-backed
profit expectations. That effect cannot be measured until a
final decision is made as to how2 the regulations will be
applied to respondent's property.' '
Because respondent failed to apply for a variance, this analysis could
not be undertaken."
3. Refinement of the Williamson County Test:
The MacDonald and Lucas Decisions
In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,"3 the Court
enunciated in more detail what the Williamson County ripeness test
requires.'24 In MacDonald, the landowner had submitted a tentative
subdivision map to the County Planning Commission detailing the
subdivision of the property into 159 single-family and multi-family
residential lots.'25 The Commission rejected the plan since the plan
failed to provide for sufficient access to the subdivision and for adequate
sewer and water service, and because the local Sheriffs Department
would not be able to provide sufficient protection to the proposed
subdivision.'26
In response, the landowner filed suit in state court for declaratory
and monetary relief. 27 In addition to making a regulatory takings
claim, the complaint stated that "any application for a zone change,
variance or other relief would be futile."'2 8 After the California Court
of Appeal affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint for
failure to state a claim and the California Supreme Court denied

121. Id. at 199-200.
122. Id. at 200.
123. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
124. Id. at 348-53.
125. Id. at 342.
126. Id. at 342-43. The Board actually rejected the plan on other grounds as well, but t!
landowners only raised these four before the Supreme court. id. at 342.
127, Id. at 344. The owner claimed that the county's denial of all permit applicatio
subdivision maps and other requests resulted in the county's appropriation of the property
a "public, open-space buffer." Id.
128. Id.
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review,'29 the landowner petitioned for review by United States
Supreme Court."3
The MacDonald Court began its inquiry by stating that the finality
prerequisite to a regulatory takings claim required "a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of development legally
permitted on the subject property.'' Furthermore, with respect to the
compensation requirement, the Court stated that "[t]he local agencies
charged with administering regulations governing property development
are singularly flexible institutions; what they take with the one hand
they may give back with the other."' The Court did not address
whether the regulation had gone too far or whether the compensation
was "just"since the court ruled that "no answer is possible until a Court
133
knows what use, if any, may be made of the affected property."
Although the Board rejected one subdivision proposal, the Court was
convinced that this was not a final decision since there was a possibility
that some development would be permitted."3 Therefore, since the
owner did not reapply with "less ambitious"
plans, 35 the Court held
36
review.
for
ripe
not
was
that the claim
According to the MacDonald Court, however, the reapplication
requirement may not be necessary in every situation. 37 In the pursuit
to find a definitive decision on the permissible use of the property, the

129. Id. at 346. According to the California Court of Appeal:
"[P]laintiff applied for approval of a particular and relatively intensive
residential development and the application was denied. The denial of that
particular plan cannot be equated with a refusal to permit any development,
and plaintiff concedes that the property is zoned for residential purposes in the
County general plan and zoning ordinance. Land use planning is not an all-ornothing proposition.... mhe refusal of the defendants to permit the intensive
development desired by the landowner does not preclude less intensive, but
still valuable development."
Id. at 347 (quoting the California Court of Appeal).
130. Id. at 348.
13 1. Id. "A court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows
how far the regulation goes." Id.
132. Id. at 350. "[A] court cannot determine whether a municipality has failed to provide
'just compensation' until it knows what, if any, compensation the responsible administrative
body intends to provide." Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 352.
135. Id. at 353 n.9. "Rejection of exceedingly grandiose development plans does not
logically imply that less ambitious plans will receive similarly unfavorable reviews." Id.
136. Id. at 353.
137. Id. at 350-53.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

landowner will "not [be] required to resort to piecemeal litigation or
otherwise unfair procedures in order to obtain this information."' 38 In
addition, the MacDonaldCourt stated that futile applications would not
be required under the ripeness doctrine.'39 The Court was convinced,
however, that since the property at issue was zoned residential, any
reapplication for a less intensive development plan would not be
useless.Y Although the initial application was not approved, the Court
stated that "[t]he implication is not that future applications would' 4 be
futile, but that a meaningful application ha[d] not yet been made."' '
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,142 the Supreme Court
applied the futility exception alluded to in MacDonald143 to rule that
a land use case was ripe for review.' 44 In Lucas, a developer purchased
two lots located in a coastal residential development.4 5 Although the
lots were approximately 300 feet from the beach, the developer was not
required to obtain a permit prior to development. 46 However, two
years after the developer purchased the land, the South Carolina
Beachfront Management Act established a baseline marking the points
where erosion had occurred during the last forty years. 47 The Act
prohibited "construction of occupiable improvements" seaward of the
line and provided no exceptions.4 8 Since the developer's land was
seaward of this baseline, he filed suit. 49 The South Carolina Supreme

138. Id. at 350 n.7. The Court cited to Williamson County, where Justice Stevens, in a
concurring opinion, remarked that a Due Process claim may prevail if a burdened landowner
could prove "that an unconstitutional procedure had resulted in an unnecessary delay in
obtaining approval of its development plan." Id. (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 205
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
139. Id. at 352 n.8.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
143. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
144. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012-13.
145. Id. at 1006-07. The developer paid $975,000 for two residential lots located on a
barrier island east of Charleston, South Carolina. Id. The developer intended to construct singlefamily residences on the lots, similar to the residences that had been constructed on the adjacent
lots in the development. Id.
146. Id. at 1008. The regulations in required owners of coastal zone land that qualified as
a "critical area" to obtain a permit from the South Carolina Coastal Council prior to developing
the land. Id. The parcels at issue in this litigation were not designated "critical areas." Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1008-09. The Act permitted only nonhabitable improvements, such as wooden
walkways and decks. Id. at 1009 n.2.
149. Id. at 1009.
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Court rejected his claim that the Act effected a taking of his property
without just compensation. 5 '
After the arguments before the South Carolina Supreme Court, but
before that court had ruled on the case, the Act was amended to
authorize the Council to grant special permits for construction east of
the baseline. 5 ' The Lucas Court rejected the Council's argument that
the developer's claim was not ripe since he had failed to seek a permit
under the amendment.' Since the South Carolina Supreme Court did
not rest its judgment on ripeness grounds,' the Lucas Court ruled that
"it would not accord with sound process to insist that Lucas pursue the
late-created 'special permit' procedure before his takings claim can be
considered ripe."''" Furthermore, even though the developer did not
submit any plan for development, this did not bar judicial. review.'
Applying the futility exception, the Court noted that "such a submission
would have been pointless" since the Council had stipulated that even
if there had been an application, no building permit would have been
issued. 6

150. Id. at 1009-10. That court ruled that a regulation enacted to prevent serious public
harm did not require compensation. Id. at 1010.
151. Id. at 1010-11.
152. Id. at 1012.
153. Id. As the Court stated, "the South Carolina Supreme Court shrugged off the
possibility of further administrative and trial proceedings ... preferring to dispose.., on the
merits." Id.
154. Id. According to the Court, "[t]hat there is a discretionary 'special permit' procedure
by which he may regain ... beneficial use of his land goes only to the prudential 'ripeness' of
Lucas's challenge, and.., we do not think it prudent to apply that prudential requirement here."
Id. at 1012-13. One commentator suggests that "[t]his is significant since if ripeness had been
seen as an Article IIIsubject matter jurisdiction issue, the Supreme Court would have been
obliged to dismiss the case even though the state supreme court had ignored the problem."
Roberts, supra note 25, at 14. The Lucas Court stated, however, that it did have Article III
jurisdiction:
Given the South Carolina Supreme Court's dismissive foreclosure of further
pleading and adjudication with respect to the pre-1990 component of Lucas's
taking claim, it is appropriate for us to address that component as if the case
were here on the pleadings alone. Lucas properly alleged injury in fact in his
[n]o more can reasonably be demanded.
complaint; .. .Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012 n.3.
155. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1011. However, the developer would be required to apply for a
"special permit" under the 1990 amendment for future construction before any subsequent claim
would be ripe. Id
156. Id. at 1013 n.3.
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4. Suitum and the Runaway Ripeness Train: The Change
to Put Williamson County Back on Track
On October 15, 1996, the United States Supreme Court granted57
certiorari in the case of Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.
The Court will review a decision from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that illustrates how the judiciary has
twisted the Williamson County final decision requirement and eviscerated the futility exception. Petitioner owns an 18,300 square foot parcel
of land located in a residential subdivision.'58 The Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency (TRPA), respondent, halted petitioner's plans to build
a residential home on the parcel after determining that the parcel was
located in a Stream Environment Zone (SEZ).'59 Under the local plan,
the TRPA establishes a number under the Individual Parcel Evaluation

System (IPES) representing a parcel's relative environmental suitability
for development."6 Since petitioner's property was located in a SEZ,
the TRPA assigned the parcel a zero IPES score. 6' As a result of this

157. 80 F.3d 359 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 96-243). The
questions presented for review are as follows:
Must a property owner sell transferable development rights (TDRs) and apply for
agency approval of the sale in order to ripen a takings claim under the Williamson
County final decision requirement:
a) when the regulatory agency has already conclusively determined that no
viable use of her parcel of land will be permitted;
b) when a TDR transfer will not allow her to make any use of her parcel of
land; and
c) when the maximum extent of TDRs available for transfer are already definite
and certain, and can be valued by normal appraisal methods?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Suitum (No. 96-243).
158. Suitum, 80 F.3d at 361. Other residences border three sides of the parcel at issue while
a "paved street with a curb, gutter, and all utilities necessary for a single-family residence"
border the fourth side of the parcel. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4.
159. The local plan creates these SEZs to convey surface waters from upland areas into
Lake Tahoe and its tributaries. Suitum, 80 F.3d at 361. Once a parcel is designated an SEZ, the
plan only allows new land coverage or other permanent land disturbance "for certain limited
public uses." Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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score, petitioner was precluded from any development on the parcel.162
The TRPA upheld the IPES score after petitioner appealed.'
Ideally, this claim would be ripe for review under Williamson
County."6 However, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's grant
of summary judgment to the respondent on ripeness grounds. 6 5 The
key to the Ninth Circuit's opinion was the Transfer of Development
Rights (TDR) program established by TRPA. Under the TDR program,
a property owner may transfer land coverage, residential development
rights, and residential allocations."6 Since petitioner did not apply to
under the TDR program, the court held that her claim
transfer her rights
167
was not ripe.
The court referred to the Williamson County requirement when it
ruled that before filing suit, petitioner should have sought a " 'final
decision from [TRPA] regarding the application of the regulation to the
property at issue.' "", According to the court, "[w]ithout an application for the transfer of development rights, TRPA is foreclosed from
determining the extent of the use of Suitum's property."' 69 The court
equated the TDR program with modifications of development plans and
requests for variances, stating that the common theme is "facilitating
alternative uses of the property."' 70 The court concluded that the TRPA
transfer of development rights scheme was a use of SEZ property. 7

162. The plan "establishes four criteria that the property owner must meet before building
a single-family residence: (1) an IPES score above the numerical level established for
development in that calendar year; (2) a residential development right; (3) adequate land
coverage; and (4) a residential allocation." Id.
163. Id.
164. See supra text accompanying note 105.
165. Suitum, 80 F.3d at 364.
166. Id. at 361. Petitioner had two "rights" which would theoretically be transferred: First,
land coverage, which consisted of 183 square feet of land. Although the parcel was 18,300
square feet, the program only allowed owners of property within a SEZ to transfer one percent
of the total property area. A property owner may transfer land coverage to a receiving parcel
within the same hydrologic zone allowing for construction of a larger project on the receiving
parcel. Second, a residential development right. Subject to county approval and the use and
density eligibility of the receiving parcel, residential development rights may theoretically be
transfered anywhere in the Lake Tahoe Basin. Although petitioner had obtained a residential
allocation in 1989, she did not use it and it reverted to the county. Id.
167. Id. at 362.
168. Id. (citing Carson Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson, 37 F.3d 468, 474 (9th Cir.
1994)) (emphasis added).
169. Id. The court continued, "[w]ithout pursuit of the transfer of development rights, we
cannot know whether the regulations have gone too far because at this point, no one knows how
far the regulations have gone." Id. (citing MacDonald,477 U.S. at 348).
170. Id. at 363.
171. Id. "The key inquiry is whether the property retains 'any reasonable beneficial use[.]'
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Petitioner argued that the claims were ripe "because the TDR
program is a 'ruse, a sham.' ,172Petitioner produced testimony from
a former TRPA staff member that the TDR program had produced no
sales and that the parcel at issue had no marketable development
rights. 173 This testimony was excluded by the trial court since he was
not an appraiser capable of providing "valuation" of development
rights.1 74 Since TRPA presented evidence that Suitum's development
rights "possess some significant value," the court concluded that
petitioner failed to show that participation in the TDR program would
be futile.77 Thus, since petitioner did not apply for transfers through
the TDR program, the court held that the claims were not ripe for
adjudication.'76
The Suitum decision from the Ninth Circuit is a clear misapplication
of the final decision requirement of Williamson County. The Suitum
court itself cited the final decision requirement as mandating a final
decision regarding the application of the regulations "to the property at
issue." 17 Indeed, the TRPA did apply the regulations to the property
when it determined that the property was located in the SEZ and
assigned it an IPES score of zero. 17 By allowing the TRPA, or any
other agency, to implement a scheme to indefinitely avoid a final
decision by tying a use of one's land to a theoretical transfer of TDR's
to another person's parcel, an aggrieved property owner will be forever

Id. (citing MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 349). "'That the possible uses under TRPA's unusual
procedure are transfers of development rights from Suitum's property rather than, for example,
reapplications of development plans for her property, is immaterial." Id. (emphasis in original).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. The court ruled that exclusion of this testimony was not an abuse of discretion
since the witness's "experience in facilitating property owners in TDR program transfers is not
equivalent to experience in assigning a market value to TRPA development rights." Id.
175. "TRPA's evidence shows that without an allocation right, Suitum's development rights
are valued from $10,000 to $21,500 or more. With an allocation right, the value increases by
approximately $30,000 [although she had no allocation right]." Id.
176. Id. at 364.
177. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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stuck in a ripeness maze seeking a final decision.'79 The end result
will be no access to the judiciary.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit's handling of the futility exception is
in contravention of the Lucas decision."s The Lucas Court stated that
it would have been "pointless" for a developer to send a plan for
development because no building permit would have been issued.'
Likewise in the Suitum case, the petitioner argued that the TDR program
would not result in any sales.' Furthermore, the MacDonald Court
stated that in seeking a final decision, a landowner would not have to
resort to "unfair procedures to obtain this information."'' By requiring
Suitum to proceed in a TDR program that has not been successful, the
TRPA as well as the Ninth Circuit are requiring a landowner to proceed
through "unfair procedures." The United States Supreme Court should
take this opportunity to place the Williamson County test back on track
in order to avoid such inequitable results.
B. The Eleventh Circuit's Formulationof
the Ripeness Test
In Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 84 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied the Williamson County ripeness
test and held a state takings claim was ripe for review.185 In Corn, a
179. According to the petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
The Ninth Circuit has compounded the confusion by its application of the final
decision ripeness doctrine in this case. The court below requires Mrs. Suitum to
apply for administrative approval of the use of transferrable development rights by
another landowner in order to ripen her takings claim. This holding severs the final
decision ripeness requirement from its doctrinal underpinning-which is to allow
courts to analyze takings claims in the context of a definitive determination of the
extent of development allowed on the subject property. The Ninth Circuit has taken
a doctrine that aims for certainty and rendered it uncertain, as there is no limit to
the number of irrelevant procedures that a property owner may be forced to utilize.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12.
180. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003; see supra notes 142-56 and accompanying text.
181. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1013 n.3.
182. See supra note 17.
183. MacDonald,477 U.S. at 350 n.7.
184. 816 F.2d 1514 (1lth Cir. 1987).
Eleventh Circuit cases in which both
185. Id. at 1520. Although Corn was one of the first
the finality prong and the state compensation prong of the Williamson County test were applied,
two prior Eleventh Circuit decisions had held takings claims were not ripe for failure to seek
compensation under available state procedures prior to filing claims in federal court. See Boothe
v. Manatee County, 812 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff failed to show that Florida's
inverse condemnation remedy for the taking of a right of way for road purposes unavailable or
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landowner, after more than ten years of struggling with the city over its
zoning changes, filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
city.'86 The case was dismissed from federal district court on ripeness
grounds. 8 7 On appeal however, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the
landowner had satisfied both portions of the Williamson County ripeness
test. 88
Applying the finality prong, the Corn court ruled that there was "no
issue" that this prong had been met since the City had already rejected
one plan and had conceded that no development would have been
permitted.'89 Therefore, since the ordinance created a complete moratorium on development of the property, any variance request would have
been futile." In addition, the landowner fulfilled the state compensation requirement since, at the time, Florida had no procedures by which
a property owner could recover compensation for injuries resulting from
an unreasonable zoning regulation later declared invalid.' Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for review on the merits."l
In Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County,'93 the Eleventh Circuit
dismissed several counts of the landowners' complaint as not ripe."
In Executive 100, plaintiffs "filed applications for amendments to the
Martin County Comprehensive Land Use Plan to change the zoning of
their parcels from agricultural/rural ranchette to industrial."' 95 After the
Board of County Commissioners denied the requests, the plaintiffs filed
suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.196 The plaintiffs appealed after
the district court dismissed all counts of the complaint as not ripe.'97

inadequate); Anthony v. Franklin County, 799 F.2d 681 (11 th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff failed to show
that Florida's inverse condemnation remedy for deprivation or impairment of right of access
unavailable or inadequate).
186. Corn, 816 F.2d at 1515. Two months after the landowner had received approval of site
plans for the building of a mini-warehouse/shopping center, the city council adopted three new
ordinances which prevented further development of the property. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1520.
189. Id. at 1516 n.3. The court stated that "[f]inality is manifested by a showing that there
is no beneficial use to which the property may be put ..... Id. at 1516.
190. Id. at 1516.
191. Id. at 1519.
192. Id. at 1520.
193. 922 F.2d 1536 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 810 (1991).
194. Id. at 1542.
195. Id. at 1538. Rural Ranchette permits development of one house per five acres. Id. at
1538 n.1.
196. Id. at 1538.
197. Id. at 1539.
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Addressing the plaintiffs due process takings claims, the Eleventh
Circuit stated that "[i]n order for these claims to be ripe for adjudication, the plaintiffs must obtain a final decision regarding the application
of the zoning ordinances to their property, including denial of variance
applications."' 98 The court also ruled that the plaintiffs' taking of
property without just compensation claim was not ripe.'99 After citing
the Williamson County ripeness requirements, the court ruled that the
plaintiffs failed to pursue just compensation from the State of Florida.' ° Although the Eleventh Circuit had ruled in Corn that Florida did
not provide a procedure for pursuing just compensation, "° two recent
decisions required a different conclusion by the Executive 100 court.2"
The court cited First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los
Angeles, 3 where the United States Supreme Court held that "when a
state regulation temporarily deprives a property owner of all use of his
property, the state must provide for compensation under the just
compensation clause."'2 4 Moreover, the Executive 100 court noted that
"Florida courts have recognized that under First Lutheran Church
property owners have the right to bring reverse condemnation proceedings seeking compensation for regulatory takings."2 " Therefore, since
the plaintiffs had not pursued compensation through Florida's inverse
condemnation proceeding, the plaintiffs' claims that the government had
confiscated their property without just compensation were not ripe for
adjudication.'
In Tari v. Collier County,' the Eleventh Circuit demonstrated that
it will go to extreme bounds to find the lack of a final decision. 8 The
plaintiffs in Tari had owned and operated a wholesale and retail fruit
tree business in Collier County for nearly eight years.'1 Tari received
a Notice of Violation from a Collier County Code Enforcement
Investigator which ordered Tari to cease all operations of the nursery. 10 After complying with the order, Tari "contacted several individ198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 1540.
Id. at 1542.
Id.
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
Executive 100, 922 F.2d at 1542.
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
Executive 100, 922 F.2d at 1542 (citing First Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 315).
Id. (citing Joint Ventures, 563 So. 2d at 622).
Id.
56 F.3d 1533 (11th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 1535-37.
Id. at 1534.
Id. The Notice provided in part;
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uals within the Zoning Department to investigate the status of his case
and to discuss his options.. ' ... Tari filed suit against the County after
the County issued a second Notice of Violation.2" 2 Although a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation finding the complaint
was ripe, the district court dismissed the as applied arbitrary and
capricious due process claim and the just compensation temporary taking
claim as not ripe.213
The Eleventh Circuit applied the Williamson County test and ruled
that for either claim to be ripe, the decisionmaker must have reached a
final decision regarding the application of the ordinance to the property.2" 4 The court held that the County had not made a final decision to
apply the zoning ordinance to the property.215 According to the court:
Despite the language in the Notice which instructed Tari to
cease his operations immediately, it was made obvious to
him that the decision of the Code Enforcement Investigator
to send the Notice, much like the decision of a police
officer to make an arrest, was not a final decision to apply
the zoning ordinance to his property.2 6
The court reasoned that Tai's conversations with members of the
zoning department "should have signalled to him that a final decision
All wholesale and retail operations must cease at the above location and all
signs must be removed IMMEDIATELY upon receipt of this notice .... Any
person who violates this zoning ordinance or who fails to comply with any of
the requirements shall upon conviction thereof be fined, or imprisoned, or both
as provided by law and in addition shall pay all costs and expenses involved
in the case. Each day such a violation continues shall be considered a separate
offense.
Id. (emphasis in original).
211. Id. Both the investigator and the Code Enforcement Director advised Tad that if he
did not agree with the investigator's interpretation of the zoning ordinance, he could have the
matter reviewed by the Collier County Zoning Director. Id. The Assistant County Attorney sent
a letter to Tad explaining the County's two alternative methods of enforcing a zoning violation.
Id. One method was to prosecute a zoning violation in County Court as a misdemeanor after the
County Attorney's legal opinion is completed and the State Attorney's office is directed to
proceed. Id. The other method was to take the zoning violation to the Code Enforcement Board.
Id. If a violation is confirmed, "an Order to Comply is entered and fines only begin to run upon
non-compliance after the date set for compliance by the Board." Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1535.
214. Id. (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186).
215. Id. at 1537.
216. Id. at 1536. "Despite the strong language in the Notice of Violation instructing Tad
to shut down his nursery, we cannot conclude that this Notice constituted a final decision." Id.
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had not yet been made" and that the proper procedure would be to
appeal to the Code Enforcement Board.217 The court concluded that
since the Code Enforcement Board had not decided whether or not Tari
had violated a zoning ordinance, the case was not ripe for review.21
C. FloridaState Courts' Adoption of the
Williamson County Test
Although prior Florida courts had incorporated ripeness principles in
land use decisions, 19 and others had actually discussed the Supreme
Court's ripeness test, one of the first Florida courts to articulate
ripeness standards was the First District Court of Appeal in Glisson v.
Alachua County. 1 Although the landowner had filed a facial challenge against land use regulations, the Glisson court nonetheless
proceeded to discuss the ripeness standards that would apply to an as
applied takings claim.' The court noted that " 'an essential prerequisite to a taking claim is a final decision by the government as to what
use of the property will be allowed,' "' and then stated that "[a] final
decision may be shown by (1) a rejected development plan, and (2) a
denial of a variance."224 Furthermore, the court ruled that the futility
exception could not be invoked "until at least one meaningful application has been filed."' The court, however, stated that the foregoing
requirements would not be applicable to a taking claim arising in the
context of a facial challenge. 6
217. Id. at 1536-37.
218. Id. at 1537. "[l]f a local investigator's issuance of a citation was all that was necessary
for a claim to ripen, the federal courts would become 'master zoning boards' in disputes which
are best handled at the local level." Id.
219. See, e.g., Moviematic Indus. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 349 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1977) (affirming lower court's denial of review of a rezoning since landowner failed to
take positive steps to develop the property).
220. See, e.g., Department of Envtl. Regulation v. MacKay, 544 So. 2d 1065 (Fla.3d DCA
1989) (concluding that landowner's claim was premature due to failure to apply for permit and
seek variance); Bensch v. Metropolitan Dade County, 541 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
(affirming dismissal of landowner's taking complaint for failure to seek variance); Joint
Ventures, 519 So. 2d at 1072 (Ervin, J.,
concurring) (arguing claim should have been dismissed
for failure to obtain a final decision from agency, as required by United States Supreme Court
precedent); Lee County v. New Testament Baptist Church, 507 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
(ruling that since landowner requested and received variances, the regulation had not been
applied to property).
221. 558 So. 2d 1030 (1st DCA), rev. denied, 570 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1990).
222. Id. at 1035-36.
223. Id. at 1036 (citing MacDonald,477 U.S. at 348).
224. Id. (citing Unity Ventures v. Lake County, 841 F.2d 773, 774 (7th Cir. 1988)).
225. Id. (citing Unity Ventures, 841 F.2d at 775).
226. Id."Where, as in the instant case, a taking claim arises in the context of a facial
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In City of Jacksonville v. Wynn,227 the First District Court of

Appeal of Florida held that a takings claim was not ripe for review since
the landowners failed to obtain a final decision concerning application
of a comprehensive plan to the subject property.22 In Wynn, owners
of six residential lots claimed that the effect of the City's Comprehensive Plan, as applied to their property, constituted a taking for which
compensation was due.229 The owners claimed that their property,
zoned Low Density Residential under the Plan, was no longer conducive
to residential zoning.23 The owners presented expert testimony stating
that the property values would more than triple if the land were zoned
commercial.2 3 '

The Wynn court reversed the trial court's determination that a taking
occurred. 32 Because the landowners had not submitted any plan for
the development of the property or sought a plan amendment, the court
ruled that the city had not been given the opportunity to apply the plan
to the subject property.233 Therefore, since there was no final decision
concerning application of the Plan to the property, the takings claim was
not ripe for review.23 4

The Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida, in Tinnerman v.
Palm Beach County,235 ruled that even under a complete building

permit moratorium, a landowner's inverse condemnation claim was not
ripe. 36 In Tinnerman, landowners petitioned Palm Beach County to
rezone the subject property from agricultural residential to general
commercial, with a concurrent special exception to permit a planned
commercial development.237 The Board of County Commissioners
approved the zoning change petition and granted a building permit for
a warehouse. 38 The Board, however, ruled that no other building
permits would be issued until construction of a six-lane highway had

challenge rather than in the context of a concrete controversy concerning the effect of a
regulation on a specific parcel of land, the only issue is whether the mere enactment of the
regulation constitutes a taking." Id.
227. 650 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
228. Id. at 188.
229. Id. at 184.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 188.
233. Id. at 187.
234. Id. at 188.
235. 641 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
236. Id. at 524.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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begun.239 The landowners filed a complaint in circuit court, which
found the claims seeking declaratory relief and recovery for inverse
condemnation were not ripe for review.2"
The court cited the Williamson County requirement for a final
decision and then proceeded to describe the functions of the ripeness
" ' According to the Tinnerman court, "the doctrine recognizes
doctrine.24
decisions are subject to change based on input from various and
competing interests."242 Furthermore, "the ripeness requirement of a
'final decision' enables a court to determine whether a taking has
occurred, and, if so, its extent." 243
The Tinnerman court ruled that, although the zoning regulations
provided that the board's action was a "final action,"'' " the board's
decision was not a final decision. 5 According to the court, "the
ripeness requirement of a final decision requires more than procedural
finality because it includes an opportunity for government to change its
mind."2' Notwithstanding the building permit moratorium, the court
reasoned that the burden was on the landowner to convince the board to
lift the moratorium.247 The court also refused to recognize the
landowner's futility argument, ruling that "[fiutility is not established
until at least one meaningful application has been filed."4" Thus, since
the court ruled that it was "left to speculate as to what actions the
county would have taken had appellants pursued available alternatives,"
the court ruled that the case was not ripe. 9
IV. THE RIPENESS STANDARD IN FLORIDA LAND USE
An analysis of both federal and state land use decisions illustrate that
the ripeness requirements vary depending upon the type of takings claim
the landowner files. In addition, these standards will vary somewhat

239. Id.
240. Id. at 525.

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. The Executive Director of Palm Beach County Planning, Zoning, and Building
Department testified that the board has the authority to take final action on zoning matters and
that the vote to approve or deny a petition is "final action." Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. "Although the code is silent on obtaining variances when a use is approved, it
provides fdr such steps as applying for modifications, or abandoning the special use." Id.
247. Id. at 525-26. "Appellant made no attempt to have the board alter its decision." Id.at
526.
248. Id. "Appellants' futility argument is purely speculative." Id. (footnote omitted).
249. Id.
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depending on whether the claim is filed in federal or state court.2"
This section summarizes the ripeness requirements that apply to a Fifth
Amendment Takings claim.
A. As Applied Fifth Amendment Taking Claim
In order for a violation of the Just Compensation Clause to be ripe
for adjudication, the landowner must overcome two hurdles: the
requirement for a final decision, and the need to resort to state procedures for just compensation."' As the Williamson County Court
reasoned, the final decision requirement is necessary to determine "the
economic impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it
'
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations."252
The
state compensation prong is required since the Fifth Amendment is
violated only if compensation is denied.
1. Final Decision
The Florida courts have adopted the federal ripeness requirement of
a final decision from the government regarding the permissible uses of
the landowner's property. 3 The final decision prong includes three
components: (a) Development Application, (b) Variance Request, and (c)
Reapplication. One commentator describes these three requirements in
terms of "thresholds" that must all be passed in order to avoid dismissal
of an as applied taking claim on ripeness grounds.
a. Development Application Requirement
The first component of the final decision prong is the requirement
that the landowner submit a development application or permit request
to the appropriate agency. Initially articulated by the Agins Court,255
this requirement has been applied by both lower federal courts256 and

250. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution applies against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 239 (1897); see also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 623
n.1 (1981).
251. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186; see also Tari, 56 F.3d at 1535; Eide, 908 F.2d
at 720; Wynn, 650 So. 2d at 186.
252. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 191; see supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., Martin County v. Section 28 Partnership, 668 So. 2d 672, 678 (Fla. 4th DCA
1996).
254. Blaesser, supra note 60, at 78.
255. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
256. See, e.g., Tari, 56 F.3d at 1535; Eide, 908 F.2d at 720; Corn, 816 F.2d at 1516;
Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 845 F. Supp. 1540, 1546 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
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443

by the Florida state courts.2' The rationale for requiring a submission
of a development plan or permit request is that without such a submission or request, the government entity charged with implementing the
ordinance would not have an opportunity to apply the ordinance to the
property."8 The courts require an owner to submit a "meaningful
application"2 9 and to make "a definite and meaningful effort to
obtain... approval.... ."2
An application will not be considered meaningful if the owner's
"actual intent" was to use the property for some other purpose.2 61
Moreover, the agency's denial "must be based on the merits of the
application before direct access to the circuit court is available."262
Therefore, procedural or substantive errors in the application or
administrative hearing thereon would preclude fulfilling the application
condition.263
b. Variance Request Requirement
In addition to submitting an initial application or request, a landowner must seek a variance request from the agency before the decision will
be a final decision. According to one author: "A variance is an
administrative authorization for property to be used in a manner
departing from the literal requirements of a zoning ordinance. A
variance may be granted where strict enforcement of the applicable
regulations... would result in unnecessary hardship." 2' A variance
request, as set forth in Williamson County, "would result in a conclusive
determination by the [entity] ... whether it would allow [landown-

257. Palm Beach County v. Wright, 641 So. 2d 50, 54 (Fla. 1994); Tampa-Hillsborough
County v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d 54, 58 (Fla. 1994); Schillingburg, 659 So. 2d at 1180;
Taylor, 659 So. 2d at 1173; Wynn, 650 So. 2d at 187; Tippett v. City of Miami, 645 So. 2d 533,
534 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Yardarm Restaurant, 641 So. 2d at 1386; Tinnerman, 641 So. 2d at
525; Alexander v. Town of Jupiter, 640 So. 2d 79, 82 (4th DCA), appeal dismissed, 648 So. 2d
725 (Fla. 1994); Martinez v. Bolding, 570 So. 2d 1369, 1370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Glisson, 558
So. 2d at 1036; Morales, 557 So. 2d at 654; MacKay, 544 So. 2d at 1066; Bensch, 541 So. 2d
at 1330; New Testament Church, 507 So. 2d at 628; Bowen v. Florida, 448 So. 2d 566, 568 (Fla.
2d DCA 1984).
258. See, e.g., Wynn, 650 So. 2d at 187.
259. See, e.g., Section 28 Partnership,668 So. 2d at 678; Shillingburg,659 So. 2d at 118081; Taylor, 659 So. 2d at 1172-73; Glisson, 558 So. 2d at 1036.
260. Yardarm Restaurant, 641 So. 2d at 1387.
261. See Shillingburg, 659 So. 2d at 1180-81 (stating "[w]e cannot consider [the]
application for a dock to be a meaningful application if [the] actual intent was to use the
property to build a residence").
262. Bowen, 448 So. 2d at 569.
263. See id.
264. PATRICK J. ROHAN, 6 ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 43.01[2] (1996).
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er] ... to develop the subdivision in the manner [the landowner]
proposed." '6 5 Lower federal courts2s6 and Florida state courts 67 demand that a landowner request a variance before a case will be deemed
ripe. The Eleventh Circuit has required a landowner to "have applied for
at least one variance to a contested zoning ordinance because only then
could a jury determine whether and to what extent a landowner was
deprived of her land. 268 Similarly, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
of Florida has stated that a variance must be sought because "[r]ipeness
requires a firm delineation of permitted uses so that the extent of the
taking can be analyzed. 269
According to the Eleventh Circuit, a landowner need only apply for
a variance request if a variance is available under the applicable
ordinance or regulation.2 7' However, if a variance procedure is available, a landowner's claim will not be ripe for review until the landowner
requests a variance. 7 ' Moreover, denial of a variance does not necessarily constitute a final decision for ripeness purposes.2 ' The court is
likely to require that a variance application include a development plan
and address all of the criteria mandated by the applicable variance
ordinance before the application will be deemed "meaningful.2 73
c. Reapplication Requirement
The third component of the finality requirement is that the landowner
has sought reapplication of the development proposal or permit request.
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court believed that an application for a
smaller structure possibly would have been approved. 4 Similarly,
according to the MacDonald Court, a reapplication for less grandiose
plans would have presumably been met with more favorable review. 5
76
Since "[1]and use planning is not an all-or-nothing proposition,"

265. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193.
266. See, e.g., Tari, 56 F.3d at 1536 n.5; Reahard, 30 F.3d at 1415; Executive 100, 922
F.2d at 1540-41; Eide, 908 F.2d at 721; Greenbrier,881 F.2d at 1574; Corn, 816 F.2d at 1516.
267. See, e.g., Tinnerman, 641 So. 2d at 525-26; Glisson, 558 So. 2d at 1036; Morales, 557
So. 2d at 654; MacKay, 544 So. 2d at 1066; Bensch. 541 So. 2d at 1330; New Testament Baptist
Church, 507 So. 2d at 628; Shirley Homes, 291 So. 2d at 42-43.
268. Tari, 56 F.3d at 1536 n.5.
269. Tinnerman, 641 So. 2d at 526.
270. Greenbriar,881 F.2d at 1575.
271. MacKay, 544 So. 2d at 1066; Bensch, 541 So. 2d at 1330.
272. McKee v. City of Tallahassee, 664 So. 2d 333, 334 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
273. Id.
274. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 137; see supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
275. MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 353 n.9.
276. Id. at 347.
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there is an assumption that "what [an agency may] ... take with the
one hand they may give back with the other."2' The Eleventh Circuit
has stated that a reapplication is required in a takings claim because "a
determination on precisely what use is permitted is of great relevance
in ascertaining whether a taking has occurred."278
d. Exception to the Final Decision Requirement
The futility exception alluded to in a footnote to the MacDonald
opinion has become a part of the ripeness analysis. 9 The Lucas Court
applied the exception, noting that it would have been "pointless" to
require submission of development plans as a prerequisite to judicial
review since the authorities had stipulated that no building permit would
have been issued.28 The futility exception may apply when the agency
lacks power to grant relief or is "openly hostile" to the proposed
development, or when the regulation was adopted to prevent the type of
proposed development.28 The Eleventh Circuit has stated that the
futility exception "does excuse the repeated submission of development
plans where the submission would be futile." '82 However, the Florida
courts have been reluctant to apply this exception to landowners'
claims." 3
2. State Compensation Prong
According to the Williamson County Court, this prong requires a
landowner to seek compensation through state provided procedures
before a takings claim will be ripe for judicial review.284 This requirement will be triggered if the landowner's suit is filed or is removed to
a federal court.28 Furthermore, this prong must be satisfied only if the
state compensation procedure is both available and adequate.286 The
rationale for this requirement is that the Fifth Amendment proscribes
only a taking without just compensation.287

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at 350.
Greenbriar,881 F.2d at 1576 n.ll.
MacDonald,477 U.S. at 353 n.8.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
Berger, supra note 13, § 7.03[6], at 7-30 to 7-36.
Eide, 908 F.2d at 726 (footnote omitted).
See infra pt. V.B.
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195.
See, e.g., Reahard, 30 F.3d at 1417-18.
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 196.
See id. at 194-97.
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The Eleventh Circuit has enforced this requirement. 8 The Corn
court had found the takings claim to be ripe since at the time Florida
had not established a state remedy for inverse condemnation." 9 Inverse
condemnation is "a cause of action against a governmental defendant to
recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the
governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power
of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.""
Florida now provides such a procedure for seeking compensation."'
Therefore, before a takings claim will be ripe for review by a federal
court, the landowner in Florida must seek compensation through
Florida's inverse condemnation process. 2
B. Facial Takings Claim
If a plaintiff files a facial challenge to an ordinance or regulation, the
claim will be ripe for review as soon as that ordinance or regulation
becomes effective.293 In filing a facial challenge, the landowner is
typically seeking an invalidation of a regulation or ordinance.294 As the
First District Court of Appeal of Florida stated in Glisson, "[w]here...
a taking claim arises in the context of a facial challenge rather than in
the context of a concrete controversy concerning the effect of a
regulation on a specific parcel of land, the only issue is whether the
mere enactment of the regulation constitutes a taking." '95 Although the
ripeness requirements can be avoided by filing a facial challenge, a
landowner's chance of success on such a claim is slim.296
V.

THE PITFALLS OF LAND USE
RIPENESS REQUIREMENTS

The rationale of the original ripeness doctrine, as enunciated in
Abbott, was "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial

288. See Tari, 56 F.3d at 1535-38; Reahard, 30 F.3d at 1416-18.
289. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
290. DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 20.7, at 606-08 (2d ed. 1986) (quoting Thornburg v. Port of
Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 101 n.1 (Or. 1962)).
291. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
292. See Tari, 56 F.3d at 1535-38; Reahard, 30 F.3d at 1416-18.
293. See Agins, 467 U.S. at 260-63.
294. Blaesser, supra note 60, at 83.
295. Glisson, 558 So. 2d at 1036.
296. See infra pt. V.B.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol47/iss3/2

36

Maraist: A Statutory Beacon in the Land of Use Ripeness Maze: The Florida
RIPENESS DOCTRINE

interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties."297 The
ripeness doctrine has valid purposes for fulfilling Article IM requirements and for preventing judicial resources from being spent on disputes
that could be remedied before local zoning boards. However, the
ripeness doctrine has been turned into a ripeness game in the land use
context. The loser is far too often the landowner, particularly those
landowners that lack the resources to play the ripeness game.298
Furthermore, courts have applied the ripeness doctrine in such a
confusing manner that the only predictable result is that the claim is
likely to be dismissed.
A. Confusion and Inconsistency in the Judiciary
There has been confusion and inconsistency in the judiciary's
application of the ripeness doctrine to land use claims.2 99 The initial
difficulty has been deciphering what ripeness standard to apply to the
landowner's claim. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Eide provides
evidence of such confusion."0 The Eide court found that in several
cases, the courts erroneously have applied the ripeness standards of
Williamson County.3"' As the Eide court stated, "[c]ourts have confused the standards for.., just compensation, due process takings, and
arbitrary and capricious due process [claims], and often one cannot tell
which claim has been brought or which standard is being applied."3"
The Eide court recognized that this confusion may result in incorrect
disposition of a landowner's claim. 3
Another area of confusion exists with the courts' interpretation of the
exhaustion doctrine. Some courts require landowner claimants to exhaust
all administrative avenues as a condition of meeting the ripeness
requirements." The Williamson County Court explicitly recognized

297. Abbott Laboratories,387 U.S. at 148-49.
298. See Larry Kaplow, PropertyRights Bill Readied, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 16, 1995,
at Al ("[G]etting paid for regulations that limit the usefulness of your property is a bureaucratic
mess that takes years and demands a high standard of proof of damage. Both sides [of the
property rights dispute] acknowledge that small landowners have trouble surviving the process
to get compensation.").
299. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
300. See Eide, 908 F.2d at 722-26.
301. Id. at 722.
302. Id. (footnote omitted). As the court conceded, "[t]his court has itself confused due
process takings and arbitrary and capricious due process claims." Id. (citing Greenbriar,881
F.2d at 1570).
303. See id. at 722-23.
304. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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that exhaustion is not a requirement of ripeness.3 5 The inconsistent
application the two doctrines has been recognized by the Eleventh
Circuit's opinion in Reahard.3" Nonetheless, several Florida courts
still require exhaustion as an additional hurdle in the landowner's pursuit
for relief.3 7
Judicial inconsistency further complicates the land use ripeness
doctrine. The futility exception to the ripeness requirement is at the
forefront of this inconsistency."' Some courts require the landowner
to submit at least one meaningful application before this exception may
be recognized." 9 Other courts have gone further and ruled that the
futility exception could not be applied until at least one meaningful
variance has been denied." 0 This requirement may be a waste of time
for all affected parties and may result in more financial loss to the
landowner.3" ' Unless the futility exception is to remain futile, the
judiciary must clearly articulate when the exception shall apply.
B. Harsh Results to the Landowner
Although the ripeness doctrine makes theoretical sense, the practical
effect of its application in the land use context is to raise too many
obstacles for a landowner to pass prior to having a court hear the merits
of the underlying claim. Many claimants are left at the courthouse steps
after spending extraordinary amounts of money to even knock on the
courthouse door."' One study indicates that landowners have had their
cases dismissed by federal district courts in nearly 94% of the decisions.' According to the study, 26% were dismissed under the finality
requirement, 56% were dismissed for failure to pursue available state
procedures to seek just compensation, and 18% were dismissed under
both of the prongs.3 1 4 Moreover, since the ripeness doctrine is widely
305. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
306. Reahard, 30 F.3d at 1417 n.12.
307. See supra notes 16 & 18 and accompanying text.
308. "The deficiencies of the ripeness standard in zoning cases are most apparent with
regard to the 'futility exception.' " Eide, 908 F.2d at 727 (Shoob, J., concurring).
309. Id. at 726-27.
310. See, e.g., McKee, 664 So. 2d at 334.
311. "That often logical approach [requiring at least one meaningful application] ... fails
to account for specific facts, which, in the individual cases, might even render a single
application a waste of time." Eide, 908 F.2d at 727.
312. As one commentator has described the situation, the effect of ripeness at the federal
level is to "leav[e] the federal courthouse door only slightly ajar for land use cases which
involve only the most egregious examples of arbitrary action by local governments." Blaesser,
supra note 60, at 75.
313. Id. at 91.
314. Id.
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used by the Florida courts, a case dismissed
from federal court is likely
315
to meet the same fate in the state court.
The confusion in the judiciary inevitably leads to unjust effects on
the property owner. Since the court is likely to view the ripeness
determination as a jurisdictional issue,316 the landowner's claim will
be dismissed with no determination on the merits. 317 As the landowner
goes back through the entire process to try and obtain a ripe claim, the
proposed land use is halted while mortgage or other overhead expenses
may be accumulating. In addition, one commentator has noted that some
of the leading takings cases have taken up to six years to litigate with
costs exceeding half a million dollars. 3" Faced with the ripeness
hurdles, many landowners may simply decide not to even file a takings
claim.319
Moreover, the equitable considerations that formulate a portion of the
original ripeness doctrine are missing from the ripeness test that has
been applied in the land use context.320 The United States Supreme
Court, in the Abbott Laboratoriesdecision, ruled that the claim was ripe
for review since "the regulation is directed at them in particular; it
requires them to make significant changes in their everyday business
practices; if they fail to observe the Commissioner's rule they are quite
clearly exposed to the imposition of strong sanctions. 321' The courts
have clearly lost sight of any notions of equity when they require a
landowner to close down an eight-year-old business or be subject to

315. According to one commentator:
In effect, the ripeness doctrine excludes land use cases from federal courts and
requires a property owner to litigate a taking case in state court. Significantly,
once a land use case is in state court, the same federal ripeness doctrine has
been used increasingly by state courts to dismiss it. Thus, the ripeness doctrine
has been used first by federal courts, then by state courts, to deny property
owners just compensation.
Overstreet, supra note 11, at 92 (footnotes omitted).
316. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
318. Vargus, supra note 5, at 333 n.97.
319. Nancie G. Marzulla, State Private Property Rights Initiatives as a Response to
"EnvironmentalTakings," 46 S.C. L. REv. 613,628 (1995) ("Adding to the hardship, procedural
hurdles can bar litigation on the merits of takings claims for anywhere from five to ten years.
Thus, when faced with a government takings claim, many property owners choose not to pursue
their rights under the Fifth Amendment.").
320. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
321. Abbott Laboratories,387 U.S. at 154.
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fines and a criminal record and still rule that the case is not ripe for
review.322
The requirement that a landowner submit an initial plan for approval
does not pose much difficulty for the landowner. The games begin when
the courts require variance requests and multiple applications. These
obstacles will be even greater and more arbitrary if the Suitum requirement that landowners partake in a TDR program prior to a takings claim
being deemed ripe is upheld by the United States Supreme Court.3"
This "places the burden of governing on the wrong foot." 4 As an
example, a landowner's claim has been deemed not ripe even when the
applicable regulations provided that the board's decision was "final
' The Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida required the
action."325
landowner to seek a variance since "the ripeness requirement of a final
decision requires more than procedural finality because it includes an
opportunity for government to change its mind." 6 Such decisions are
'
the type that send challenging landowners on a "wild goose chase."327
Moreover, the futility exception has provided little shelter from the
landowner's trek through this bureaucratic and judicial ripeness
maze.328 In particular, the Fourth District appears to have adopted an
Eleventh Circuit opinion that would grant the futility exception only
when the landowner is informed that the "proposed project was 'dead'
and the [agency] had 'settled on a final use.'

329

The possibility of

any governmental entity communicating in such a manner to a property
owner is remote. Furthermore, such judicial pronouncements effectively
signal to the planning agencies methods by which to avoid the finality
prong.
VI. PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS LEGISLATION
The ripeness requirements in land use litigation have hindered, and,
in may instances, actually blocked landowners' pursuits for relief under

322. See Tari, 56 F.3d at 1534, 1536-37.
323. See supra pt. III.A.4.
324. See Shillingburg, 659 So. 2d at 1179; supra note 12.
325. Tinnerman, 641 So. 2d at 525.
326. Id. "Although the code is silent on obtaining variances when a use is approved, it
provides for such steps as applying for modifications, or abandoning the special use." Id.
327. See supra note 12.
328. As one commentator noted, "[ain allegation of futility based on unofficial policy is
difficult to establish, absent years of delay or multiple application rejections." Lyman, supra note
40, at 123-24.
329. Tinnennan, 641 So. 2d at 526 n.3 (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of
Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1546-47 (11th Cir. 1994)).
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traditional takings law." After years of frustration with this judicial
ripeness barricade,33 ' burdened landowners have taken their grievances
to the legislative branches. 2 The frustration is evidenced by the
growing number of legislative attempts to ease the difficulties landowners have suffered. It has been estimated that over sixty property rights
bills have been introduced at the state level across the nation. 3
The property rights movement in the state of Florida gained
momentum during the 1970s." However, it was the legislative battles
of the 1990s that ultimately led to the passage of the Property Rights
Act. 5 This Act provides an opportunity for burdened landowners to
have their claims addressed by the judiciary. Although the Act does not
change the ripeness requirements of takings jurisprudence, 336 the
statutory ripeness provisions are a beacon for potential landowner
litigants. Before introducing and analyzing the ripeness aspects of the
Property Rights Act, a brief background of the events that occurred just
prior to the passage of the Act will shed light on the relevant political
climate.337
A. The Governor's PropertyRights
Study Commission II
In 1993, Florida Governor Lawton Chiles established the Governor's
Property Rights Study Commission H to evaluate the status of property
rights in the state of Florida and to make proposals to the Governor. 8
The seventeen-member Commission held public meetings throughout the
state to hear testimony from concerned citizens.339 Many of the

330. See supra pt. V.B.
331. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
332. See Marzulla, supra note 319, at 628; Powell, supra note 5, at 258.
333. Marzulla, supra note 319, at 633 (footnote omitted).
334. Powell, supra note 5, at 258.
335. Id. at 259-65.
336. See supra note 3.
337. This section is intended only to provide a brief overview of the legislative history of
the property rights proposals and the relation to the ripeness standards. For a more detailed
analysis, see Powell, supra note 5, § II; Kent Wetherell, Florida Property Rights Legislation:
The "Midnight Version" and Beyond, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 525 (1994).
338. FLA. EXEC. ORDER No. 93-150 §§ 1, 2 (June 4, 1993). The governor's directions to
the Commission included studying "[t]he issue of protection of private property rights and the
protection of the public interest in proper growth management and environmental protection"
and "[t]he current and potential effectiveness of Florida law in providing substantially affected
persons with appropriate remedies of law to protect their private property rights and any changes
necessary to assure meaningful and effective remedy to affected property amounts." FLA. EXEC.
ORDER No. 93-354 § 3 (Dec. 28, 1993).
339. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 56-57. The Commission heard from 62
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landowners that testified complained that "the system is too complex
and expensive."" Other landowners expressed frustration with the
delay inherent in the current judicial process.34 ' Such concerns appeared to be directed at the absurd and harsh effects of the ripeness
requirements.
The Commission proposed legislation whereby a landowner who
believed that a development order "inordinately limited the effective and
practical use" of the property may apply for intermediation.3 42 The
proceeding with the intermediator was to be "informal," with the focus
of the inquiry being on "the impact of the governmental action. 343
The proposed legislation addressed the ripeness issue by providing that,
upon either the agency's or the landowner's rejection of the
intermediator's recommendation, the agency issue "a decision which
describes the use or uses available to the subject property." 3 4 Once the
agency issued such an order, the claim would have been ripe, as a
matter of law, for judicial review.3 45 During the 1994 Regular Session
of the Legislature, the substance of the Commission's proposal was filed
as House Bill 1967.346 Although the bill raised needed debate on the
status of property rights, the legislation was never passed.347
B. The Private Property Rights ProtectionAct
After several other efforts to pass private property rights legislation
also failed during the 1994 legislative session, 348 both the Florida
House and Senate again considered bills addressing the issue during the
1995 session. 349 The political pressure on the legislature was high since
witnesses in three public hearings held in North, Central, and South Florida. Id. at 56.
340. Id. at 57. According to the Report, the citizens believed that "[r]esort to the judicial
system did not seem to present a meaningful opportunity." Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 7-8.
343. Id. at 16-17.
344. Id. at 28-29.
345. Id. at 29.
346. Powell, supra note 5, at 261 & n.20; Wetherell, supra note 337, at 546 n.146; see also
Fla. H.B. 1967 (1994).
347. See Powell, supra note 5, at 261.
348. See id. at 260-61; Wetherell, supra note 337, at 549-53.
349. See Fla. H.B. 1335 (1995); Fla. S.B. 2912 (1995). These bills were both based on a
draft bill written by an ad hoc working group. "Governor Lawton Chiles directed Secretary
Linda Loomis Shelley of the Florida Department of Community Affairs to convene ...to draft
a consensus proposal [for property rights legislation] which would win the support of lawmakers
and affected constituencies." Powell, supra note 5, at 263-64 (footnote omitted). Though the two
versions were initially somewhat different, Senate Bill 2912 was later changed to match the text
of the House Bill 1335. See Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 2912 (1995). Ultimately the
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there had not been any solution to the grievances voiced in the
Commission Study."5 The ensuing legislative debates pitted governmental officials and planners, who proclaimed that the Property Rights
" ' against property owners, who
Act would stifle planning efforts,35
rejoiced that they may finally be granted relief for governmental burdens
on private property." 2 The Property Rights Act, as signed by the
governor on May 18, 1995,"' 3 reflects a compromise between these
two views."
The Property Rights Act provides an aggrieved landowner an
alternative to the traditional route of a takings claim. In drafting the Act,
the Legislature intended to provide "a separate and distinct cause of
action from the law of takings."3 5 Under the Property Rights Act, a
landowner who believes that an action of the government has "inordinately burdened an existing use of real property or a vested right to a
specific use" ' is required to submit a claim in writing to the head of
the agency that issued the burdening order.3" This is to be performed
"[n]ot less than 180 days prior to filing an action under [the Property
'
Rights Act]."358
The landowner must include in the written claim a
"bona fide, valid appraisal that supports the claim and demonstrates the
loss in fair market value to the real property." '5 9 If the alleged burdening governmental action involves more than one governmental entity,
the statute requires that the landowner present such a claim to each of
these governmental entities." Furthermore, the governmental entity,
during the 180-day period, is required to make a written settlement offer
to the landowner.36
two bills "were incorporated into one amendment which was adopted as a substitute for the
language in another bill, Committee Substitute for House Bill 863." Powell, supra note 5, at
264; see also Fla. CS for B.H. 863.
350. See Powell, supra note 5, at 262.
351. Bob LaMendola, Law Lets Owners Sue If Land Is Hit by Regulations, SUN SENTINEL
(Ft. Lauderdale), May 9, 1995, at IA, 8A; Marjorie Lambert, Debate Grows Over Property
Rights: Land Owners DemandingGovernment Compensationfor Lost Values, SUN SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Apr. 4, 1995, at IA, 6A.
352. Adam Yeomans, Property Rights Bill on Governor's Desk: Chiles Expected to Sign
CompensationLaw, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), May 4, 1995, at 14A.
353. Fla. Laws ch. 95-181 (1995) (enacting Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 863

as law).
354. Vargas, supra note 5, at 318.
355. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(1) (1995).
356. Id. § 70.001(2).

357. Id. § 70.001(4)(a).
358.
359.
360.
361.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 70.001(4)(c). The settlement offer may include:
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Unless the landowner accepts the settlement offer during the "180day-notice period," each governmental entity to which a claim was
presented must issue a "written ripeness decision.""36 This ripeness
decision must identify the "allowable uses" of the property.3 63 If the
governmental entity fails to issue a ripeness decision during the 180day-notice period,the prior governmental entity's action will be deemed
ripe for review in the circuit court."
On the other hand, if the governmental entity issues a ripeness
decision, the claim also will be "ripe or final for the purpose of the
judicial proceeding created by [the Property Rights Act] ... notwithstanding the availability of other administrative remedies. 3 65 Further-

more, if the landowner rejects the governmental entity's settlement offer
and ripeness decision, the landowner may file a claim for compensation
in circuit court.3" However, the circuit court, in determining whether
the governmental entity has inordinately burdened the property, will
consider the governmental entity's offer and ripeness decision as part of
the record for review. 67

1. An adjustment of land development or permit standards or other provisions
controlling the development or use of land.
2. Increases or modifications in the density, intensity, or use of areas of
development.
3. The transfer of developmental rights.
4. Land swaps or exchanges.
5. Mitigation, including payments in lieu of onsite mitigation.
6. Location on the least sensitive portion of the property.
7. Conditioning the amount of development or use permitted.
8. A requirement that issues be addressed on a more comprehensive basis than
a single proposed use or development.
9. Issuance of the development order, a variance, special exception, or other
extraordinary relief.
10. Purchase of the real property, or an interest therein, by an appropriate
governmental entity.
11. No changes to the action of the governmental entity.
Id.
362. Id. § 70.001 (5)(a).
363. Id.
364. Id. In addition, the governmental entity's failure to issue a ripeness decision will
operate as a ripeness decision that the property owner has rejected. Id.
365. Id. This language states that the claim is ripe only for the statutory cause of action.
Thus, the ripeness decision does not equate with ripeness for purposes of a takings claim. See
Powell, supra note 5, at 282 n.165.
366. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(5)(b).
367. Id. § 70.001(6)(a).
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C. Analysis of the Ripeness Provision of the Act
The Property Rights Act provides an alternative to the rigidity and
harshness of the ripeness doctrine that has been applied to the traditional
land use claims. The legislation addresses the citizens' frustrations with
the judicial system that were voiced to the Property Rights Cominission 68 As a result of the Property Rights Act, the relative burdens of
the parties are now on a more equal footing since both the landowner
and the government are required to take affirmative steps to resolve the
land use dispute. 69 This will alleviate the complexity and delay that
landowners have historically confronted when seeking relief in the
judiciary.
Under the Property Rights Act, the landowner is required to submit
a proposal to the agency, just as would be required if the landowner
were pursuing a takings claim."' However, the landowner no longer
has to seek endless variance requests and submit numerous
reapplications in order to proceed under the Property Rights Act. 7 '
Once the governmental entity has the landowner's proposal, it is
required to make a decision on the. request and reveal, through the
"ripeness decision," the available uses of the property. 72 This prevents
the landowner from having to play a guessing game with the government as to the permissible uses of the property. The net effect is to
speed up the process for obtaining judicial review by providing
constructive ripeness 180 days after the property owner files a
claim.373
Another way in which the Property Rights Act speeds up the
ripening propcess is by recognizing, under the section that requires the
368. See supra notes 340-41 and accompanying text.
369. See FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4) & (5).
370. See supra notes 357-60 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
373. Black's Law Dictionary defines "constructive" as:

That which is established by the mind of the law in its act of construing facts,
conduct, circumstances, or instruments. That which has not the character
assigned to it in its own essential nature, but acquires such character in
consequence of the way in which it is regarded by a rule or policy of law;
hence inferred, implied, or made out by legal interpretation....
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 313 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis in original). "Constructive ripeness"
may seem to be an anomaly, but, due to the structure and mandate of the Property Rights Act,
the term seems to be appropriate to describe the result of the ripeness sections. Due to the
ripeness mess that has plagued the law of takings, perhaps there is no other method to provide
landowners their day in court than to provide for constructive ripeness.
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landowner to send the claim and appraisal to governmental entities, that
there could be multiple entities reponsible for the burdening action or
relevant to the complete resolution of the issue.37 4 Thus, the statute

mandates that the landowner send a claim to each governmental
entity."' If the landowner is not aware of the extent of the administrative process involved in resolving the dispute, the governmental entity
may be mandated to assist the landowner in resolving any ambiguity by
identifying other relevant parties.3 76 This section of the statute may
alleviate some of the problems inherent with the application of the
exhaustion requirement to the ripeness doctrine.3" By requiring a
claim to be sent to each governmental entity that may have an influence
in resolution of the dispute, and by requiring each entity to issue a
ripeness decision if a settlement is not reached,3 78 each party to the
resolution process is theoretically involved in the 180-day period. This
prevents a landowner from having to proceed in a piecemeal manner
with every possibly relevant governmental entity.379
Although the Property Rights Act speeds up the ripening of the
landowner's dispute, this is accomplished without sacrificing the
constitutional and prudential safeguards of traditional ripeness principles.38 The constitutional mandate that a case or controversy exist is
satisfied since the governmental entity's ripeness decision will be
deemed final action."' In addition, if the entity does not issue the
ripeness decision, the Property Rights Act ripens the entity's prior action
into final action."' Thus, there will not be a merely hypothetical case.
The claim, which will contain the facts of the controversy and the
appraisal value of the land, combined with the settlement offer and
ripeness decision, will provide evidence of a clear and sufficient injury
that any potential reviewing federal court will be able to evaluate in
rendering a decision.3"3

374. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(a).
375. Id.
376. Id. ("[I]f a complete resolution of all relevant issues ... in the view of a governmental
entity to whom a claim is presented, requires the active participation of more than one
governmental entity [the landowner shall present a claim to each entity]."). Id. Powell notes that
there is some ambiguity in the statute as to which party must actually submit the claim to the
other entities. Powell, supra note 5, at 277 n.128.
377. See supra notes 304-07 and accompanying text.
378. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(5)(a).

379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

See supra note 304 and accompanyimg text.
See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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The Property Rights Act also provides a mechanism for satisfying
prudential concerns."' The governmental entity's settlement offer and
ripeness decision will provide a reviewing court a record supported by
concrete facts and decisions.385 However, if the governmental entity
falls to issue either a settlement offer or a ripeness decision, satisfaction
of prudential requirements may be more attenuated. Nonetheless, since
prudential ripeness is the more flexible of the two ripeness justifications,386 the lack of a settlement offer or ripeness decision is not
detrimental to prudential ripeness principles. In any event, because the
Property Rights Act requires the landowner to provide a claim to the
governmental entity, the circuit court will be equiped with concrete facts
and the fair market value of the property." 7 This is likely to be
sufficient to satisfy prudential ripeness concerns.3 8
VII. CONCLUSION

The Property Rights Act is a legislative response to a judicial
doctrine that has stifled landowners' claims for nearly two decades. The
ripeness requirements of Williamson County and subsequent court
decisions have effectively precluded a landowner from having a judicial
determination on the merits of an as applied takings claim. By enacting
the Property Rights Act, the legislature is attempting to reopen the
courthouse doors to allow landowners access to the judiciary to assert
a fundamental constitutional right.389 Although the Property Rights Act
does not specifically change takings law,3" the constructive ripeness
provided under the Act is a step in the right direction and will permit
at least a portion of landowners to have their claims heard by the
judiciary.
Furthermore, the mere presence of the ripeness provisions in the
Property Rights Act may signal to the judiciary the need for consideration of equitable principles in application of the land use ripeness test,
as the traditional ripeness test required.39 Hopefully the judiciary will
384. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 361-63 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Furthermore, since the ripeness provisions
of the Property Rights Act do not compromise the constitutional or prudential concerns
underlying the ripeness doctrine, see supra notes 380-88 and accompanying text, the judiciary
may likewise lessen the ripeness constraints inherent in the law of takings without sacrificing
constitutional and prudential safeguards.
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respond to these signals by lessening the number of ripeness obstacles
that a landowner must overcome when pursuing a traditional takings
claim. The United States Supreme Court has the opportunity to remedy
the situation in the Suitum case, which should be set for oral arguments
early in the spring of 1997.392 If the Court clearly articulates the
ripeness standard in the land use context, landowners will be better
positioned to assert their constitutional rights. Additionally, agencies will
have more adequate notice of the line between regulation and arbitrary
and capricious tactics. This will be particularly important for those
governmental burdens that are not actionable under the Property Rights
Act393 and therefore must be pursued under the traditional routes that
have historically been blocked by ripeness requirements.

392. See supra pt. III.A.4.
393. See FLA. STAT. § 70.00](3)(C) & (D). These sections define what "governmental
entit[ies]" and "action[s] of ... governmental entit[ies]" are within the scope of the act. Id. Any
other action by any other governmental entity cannot be challenged under the act.
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